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WHERE THERE'S SMOKE, THERE'S FIRE
(AND BRIMSTONE): IS IT TIME TO ABANDON
THE CLERGY-PENITENT PRIVILEGE?
I. INTRODUCTION
Where there's smoke, there's fire. Throughout the country,
victims have accused over 2,600 members of the Catholic clergy of
sexual abuse.' This number is only expected to rise.2
Suspecting that the Catholic Church implemented an
institutional cover-up of the abuse, prosecutorial agencies have
begun attacking the problem from the top down. Thus far, judges
have ordered dioceses in Boston3 and Los Angeles 4 to release church
files as part of legal discovery. Both dioceses refused to produce
these files on the grounds that the clergy-penitent privilege protects
the documents.
5
Public outrage over such institutional secrecy has created a
social climate in which a reevaluation of the clergy-penitent privilege
1. A Dallas lawyer has begun to compile a database enumerating the
names of all clergy members who have been accused of sexual misconduct.
Although the database currently contains only 2,600 names, it is thought that
there are three- to four-times as many clergy members who have actually been
accused. Douglas J. Swanson, Church Abuse Focus of Database: Dallas
Lawyer Completes National List of 2,600 'Priest Perpetrators', DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Oct. 31, 2004, Metro at 1B; see also http://www.bishop-
accountability.org (Apr. 20, 2005).
2. Swanson, supra note 1.
3. Battle Over Los Angeles Archdiocese Documents Waged Out of Public
Eye, CNN, Nov. 13, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/11/13/
churchabuse.la.ap/index.html [hereinafter Archdiocese Documents.
4. Id.; Press Release, Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office,
Statement by D.A. Steve Cooley on Ruling by Judge Thomas F. Nuss (Sept. 8,
2004), available at http://www.da.co.1a.ca.us/mr/archive/2004/021704b.htm.
5. Archdiocese Documents, supra note 3. The documents were privileged
because priests' confessions to superiors are protected in the same manner as
those made by layperson to priest.
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is in order. Although a great deal of literature has questioned the
clergy-penitent privilege in light of the current Catholic sex
scandals, 6 this paper will attempt to divorce the privilege from the
current controversy and question its validity through a strictly
doctrinal approach.
Part II begins by discussing privilege doctrine. It then delineates
the scarce body of Supreme Court jurisprudence that specifically
addresses the clergy-penitent privilege. It ends with a discussion of
Trammel v. United States,7 and suggests that the Court's rationale in
abandoning the adverse spousal testimonial privilege in Trammel
applies equally to the abolition of the clergy-penitent privilege.
Part III discuses Wigmore's utilitarian rationale for adopting
privileges. The rationale provides four factors that a court should
consider when creating privileges. The section considers each factor
in light of the clergy-penitent privilege and concludes that the
privilege currently fails each one of the four conditions.
Part IV analyzes the clergy-penitent privilege in light of First
Amendment jurisprudence. The section begins by establishing that
the Free Exercise Clause does not protect the privilege. It concludes
by asserting that the privilege in fact violates the Establishment
Clause.
II. PRIVILEGES WITHIN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
A. Privileges, Generally
The Supreme Court, in United States v. Nixon,8 summarized the
need for relevant evidence during criminal trials as follows: "We
have elected to employ an adversary system of criminal justice in
6. See, e.g., Norman Abrams, Addressing the Tension between the Clergy-
Communicant Privilege and the Duty to Report Child Abuse in State Statutes,
44 B.C. L. REV 1127 (2003); R. Michael Cassidy, Sharing Sacred Secrets: Is it
(Past) Time for a Dangerous Person Exception to the Clergy-Penitent
Privilege?, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1627 (2003); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W.
Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical Immunity, 2004 BYU L. REV.
1789 (2004); Christopher R. Pudelski, Comment, The Constitutional Fate of
Mandatory Reporting Statutes and the Clergy-Communicant Privilege in a
Post-Smith World, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 703 (2004).
7. 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
8. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
1340
December 2006] CLERGY-PENITENT PRIVILEGE
which the parties contest all issues before a court of law. The need
to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is both
fundamental and comprehensive." 9 The Court went on to state that,
"[t]he ends of criminal justice would be defeated if judgments were
to be founded on a partial or speculative presentation of the facts[,]"
because "[t]he very integrity of the judicial system and public
confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts,
within the framework of the rules of evidence." 10  The Court
emphasized that "[t]o ensure that justice is done, it is imperative to
the function of courts that compulsory process be available for the
production of evidence needed either by the prosecution or by the
defense."' After articulating this need for "every man's
evidence,"' 2 the Court went on to state that privileges should not be
"lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation
of the search for truth."'
' 3
Although the Nixon Court emphasized that courts should not
expansively construe testimonial privileges, congress took this
mandate a step further. Congress rejected a set of proposed rules that
would have codified testimonial privileges and, in doing so,
acknowledged federal courts' authority to "continue the evolutionary
development of testimonial privileges,"' 14 by using their judicial
"reason and experience."' 5
Put simply, it is insufficient to merely create a privilege and
place it in a doctrinal closet; there must be a persuasive reason to
continue upholding a privilege. Surprisingly, this evolutionary
development has rarely-if ever--occurred in terms of the clergy-
9. Id. at 709.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 710.
13. Id. Scholars have also echoed the judicial presumption against
privileges. See, e.g., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 72, at 171 (Edward W.
Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984) (asserting that privileges "shut out the light" rather
than "facilitat[e] the illumination of truth"); Ronald J. Colombo, Forgive Us
Our Sins: The Inadequacies of the Clergy-Penitent Privilege, 73 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 225, 227 (1998) (reminding that "privileges should be cautiously
promulgated and narrowly construed in order to minimize the burdens they
impose upon the adjudicatory process").
14. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980).
15. FED. R. EvID. 501.
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penitent privilege. The Supreme Court has discussed the privilege
on only three occasions and, on each occasion, the discussion
appeared in dicta. 16 Furthermore, lower federal courts offer little
guidance on the issue.1 7  The clergy-penitent privilege has thus
largely remained tucked away from judicial scrutiny.
B. The Clergy-Penitent Privilege, Generally
All fifty states have enacted some version of the clergy-penitent
privilege.18 It was not until 1990 that a federal court fully explicated
the privilege, however. In In re Grand Jury Investigation,' 9 the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals declared that the privilege would "protect
communications made (1) to a clergyperson (2) in his or her spiritual
and professional capacity (3) with a reasonable expectation of
confidentiality. "
20
The Third Circuit's rationale for recognizing the privilege
remains somewhat unsatisfactory. Instead of applying Wigmore's
criteria 2 1 in recognizing the privilege, the court paid deference to the
Federal Rules Advisory Committee's opinion that the criteria "seem
to strongly favor a privilege for confidential communications to
clergymen." 22 The court went on to note that:
Both state and federal decisions have long recognized the
16. See Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1876); Nixon, 418 U.S.
at 709-10; Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51 (1980).
17. See infra Part II.B.
18. E.g., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 76.2, at 109 (John William Strong
ed., 4th ed. 1992).
19. 918 F.2d 374 (1990). It has been referred to as "one of the most
thorough discussion of the clergy-penitent privilege by a federal court."
Cassidy, supra note 6, at 1662.
20. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d at 384.
21. (1) "The communication must initiate in a confidence that they [sic]
will not be disclosed"; (2) "[tjhis element of confidentiality must be essential
to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties"; (3)
"[t]he relation must be one in which the opinion of the community ought to be
sedulously fostered"; and (4) "[t]he injury that would inure to the relation by
the disclosure of the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby
gained for the correct disposal of litigation." 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 2285, at
527 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961); see infra Part III.
22. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d at 384 (quoting Proposed
Rules of Evidence for the United States Court and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183,
247 (1973)).
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privilege. The Supreme Court Rules Committee also
recognized the privilege. That is doubtless because the
clergy-communicant relationship is so important, indeed so
fundamental to the western tradition, that it must be
"sedulously fostered." Confidence is obviously essential to
maintaining the clergy-communicant relationship. Although
there are countervailing considerations, we have no doubt
that the need for protecting the relationship outweighs
them.23
Although the court claimed that it was engaging in the type of
evolutionary development prescribed by Rule 501,24 in actuality, it
merely complied with what others had done before it. As opposed to
questioning why the privilege existed at all, it simply pointed to the
fact that it had, essentially, always been there; instead of discussing
the "countervailing considerations," the court accepted them at face
value. The court's circular reasoning25 in this situation provides very
little guidance on the privilege's doctrinal validity.
C. The Clergy-Penitent Privilege in Supreme Court Jurisprudence
Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning the privilege provides
equally little guidance. The Supreme Court first mentioned the
privilege in 1876 in Totten v. United States.26 The underlying case
involved the disclosure of secrets during wartime. In an exceedingly
short opinion, Justice Field made the following remarks:
It may be stated as a general principle, that public policy
forbids the maintenance of any suit in a court of justice, the
trial of which would inevitably lead to the disclosure of
matters which the law itself regards as confidential, and
respecting which it will not allow the confidence to be
violated. On this principle, suits cannot be maintained
which would require a disclosure of the confidences of the
confessional, or those between husband and wife, or of
communications by a client to his counsel for professional
23. Id. (citation omitted).
24. Id. at 383.
25. The court's reasoning is similar to the typical chicken-egg quandary:
Do courts recognize the privilege because it is important, or is the privilege
important because courts choose to recognize it?
26. 92 U.S. 105 (1876).
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advice, or of a patient to his physician for a similar purpose.
Much greater reason exists for the application of the
principle to cases of contract for secret services with the
government, as the existence of a contract of that kind is
itself a fact not to be disclosed.27
It was not until nearly a century later that the clergy-penitent
privilege reappeared within a Supreme Court decision. In Nixon, the
court considered the executive privilege and its application to
communications made during the course of the Watergate scandal.
In the midst of a discussion about the presumptive invalidity of
testimonial privileges, Chief Justice Burger noted:
The privileges referred to by the Court are designed to
protect weighty and legitimate competing interests. Thus,
the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution provides that no
man "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself." And, generally, an attorney or a
priest may not be required to disclose what has been
revealed in professional confidence. These and other
interests are recognized in law by privileges against forced
disclosure, established in the Constitution, by statute, or at
common law. Whatever their origins, these exceptions to
the demand for every man's evidence are not lightly created
nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the
search for truth.28
Lastly, Trammel v. United States29 dealt with the adverse
spousal testimonial privilege. In an effort to juxtapose that privilege,
which the court felt was overly broad, with other testimonial
privileges, Chief Justice Burger stated:
No other testimonial privilege sweeps so broadly. The
privileges between priest and penitent, attorney and client,
and physician and patient limit protections to private
communications. These privileges are rooted in the
imperative need for confidence and trust. The priest-
penitent privilege recognizes the human need to disclose to
a spiritual counselor, in total and absolute confidence, what
27. Id. at 107.
28. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709-10 (1974).
29. 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
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are believed to flawed or thoughts and to receive priestly
consolation and guidance in return.
30
D. Trammel's Rubric for Challenging a Privilege's Validity
Given that the Supreme Court has rarely and disinterestedly
discussed the privilege, Supreme Court jurisprudence is hardly an
anchor upon which the privilege may persist, at least on a
constitutional level. Although Trammel's dicta superficially
reinforces the privilege, Trammel's holding and rationale provide an
interesting rubric for challenging a privilege's validity. It was this
rubric that led the court to scrutinize and eventually abandon the
adverse spousal testimonial privilege twenty-five years ago; it is this
rubric that the court could realistically implement to abandon the
clergy-penitent privilege today.
The Court in Trammel began by discussing Federal Rules of
Evidence (FRE) 501,31 and stated that "[t]he Federal Rules of
Evidence acknowledge the authority of the federal courts to continue
the evolutionary development of testimonial privileges in federal
criminal trials 'governed by the principles of the common law as
they may be interpreted ... in the light of reason and experience."'
32
The Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence
had previously proposed Rule 505, which would have codified nine
testimonial privileges, including the clergy-penitent privilege. 33 But,
"[i]n rejecting the proposed Rules and enacting Rule 501, Congress
manifested an affirmative intention not to freeze the law of privilege.
Its purpose rather was to 'provide the courts with the flexibility to
develop rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis,' and to leave the
door open for change. 34 The Court similarly conceded that it could
not "escape the reality that the law on occasion adheres to doctrinal
concepts long after the reasons which gave them birth have
disappeared and after experience suggests the need for change. 35 In
30. Id. at 51.
31. FED. R. EVID. 501.
32. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 47 (quoting FED. R. EvID. 501). Thus, FRE 501
empowers federal courts to create and abandon privileges as creatures of
common law rather than statute.
33. Id. at 47.
34. Id. (citation omitted).
35. Id. at 48.
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conclusion, the Court mandated that when "precedent and precedent
alone is all the argument that can be made to support a court-
fashioned rule, it is time for the rule's creator to destroy it."
36
This is precisely what the Court did. It noted that support for the
privilege "ha[d] been eroded further" because the number of
jurisdictions acknowledging the privilege had declined from thirty-
one to twenty-four. 37  The Court also emphasized "[s]cholarly
criticism" of the privilege, which had "continued unabated., 38 In
other words:
Any rule that impedes the discovery of truth in a court of
law impedes as well the doing of justice. When such a rule
is the product of a conceptualism long ago discarded, is
universally criticized by scholars, and has been qualified or
abandoned in many jurisdictions, it should receive the most
careful scrutiny. Surely "reason and experience" require
that we do more than indulge in mere assumptions, perhaps
naive assumptions, as to the importance of this ancient
rule . .. 39
The Court's analysis in Trammel applies to the clergy-penitent
privilege in several ways. First, the Court's discussion makes it clear
that the law of privilege is flexible. As such, courts should be
willing to entertain the idea of abandoning the clergy-penitent
privilege.
Second, the Court made clear that privileges should not persist
based on precedent alone; if societal progress renders a privilege's
rationales outdated, then the privilege's recognition should cease.
The clergy-penitent privilege did not exist at common law 40 and first
36. Id. (quoting Francis v. Southern Pacific Co., 333 U.S. 445, 471 (1948)).
Although the clergy-penitent privilege is statutory on a state level, it exists as a
creature of common law on the federal level.
37. Id. at 48.
38. Id. at 50.
39. Id. at 54 n.1 (quoting Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 81-82
(1958)).
40. E.g., JOHN C. BUSH & WILLIAM HAROLD TIEMANN, THE RIGHT TO
SILENCE: PRIVILEGED CLERGY COMMUNICATION AND THE LAW (3d ed. 1989);
SCOTT N. STONE & RONALD S. LIEBMAN, TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES 361
(1983).
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received judicial recognition in 1813.41 The New York Court of
General Session declared that the clergy-penitent privilege was
linked inextricably with the free exercise of religion because
penitence is a sacrament of Roman Catholicism and "the sacraments
of a religion are its most important elements. ' '42 As will be discussed
at length later in this paper, First Amendment jurisprudence has
evolved over the past two-hundred years, and the scope of rights
falling under the umbrella of "free exercise" has been significantly
narrowed.43 Because the constitutional basis for the privilege has
been rendered misplaced, the privilege largely persists because of its
precedential value. The clergy-penitent privilege has become the
very type of "ancient" rule that the Trammel Court warned against.
Third, Trammel stands for the proposition that the Supreme
Court should pay deference to states' treatment of a given privilege
when deciding whether to abandon it. In terms of the clergy-penitent
privilege, states have begun chipping away at it, most notably by
writing mandatory reporting statutes that explicitly abrogate the
44privilege. One author noted the irony in the fact that "states are
narrowing the scope of the privilege in response to public outrage,
when some states adopted the privilege amid public outrage in
response to placing clergy members on the stand., 45  Such state
action may in fact be ironic, but it symbolizes a change in public
perception that cuts against retaining the privilege. If states may
create and limit privileges to correspond with ever-changing public
opinion, such action indicates that the states are indulging in the sorts
of "mere" and "perhaps naYve assumptions" that the Trammel Court
proscribed.46
Lastly, the Court suggested that scholarly criticism of a privilege
should weigh in favor of abandoning it. As of today, scholars have
41. People v. Phillips was not officially published but was detailed in
WILLIAM SAMPSON, THE CATHOLIC QUESTION IN AMERICA (1974).
42. Id. at 111.
43. See infra Part IV.A.
44. For example, Massachusetts, Illinois, Mississippi, Colorado, and New
York have added clergy to their mandatory reporting statutes. E.g., Pudelski,
supra note 6, n.79.
45. See id. at n.82.
46. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 54 n.1 (1980).
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published roughly sixty works that analyze the privilege.47 Nearly
47. See Abrams, supra note 6; Taylor L. Anderson, The Priest-Penitent
Privilege: A Mormon Perspective, 41 IDAHO L. REV. 55 (2004); Robert John
Araujo, S.J., International Tribunals and Rules of Evidence: The Case for
Respecting and Preserving the "Priest-Penitent" Privilege Under
International Law, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 639 (2000); Cheryl G. Bader,
"Forgive Me Victim for I Have Sinned": Why Repentance and the Criminal
Justice System Do Not Mix-A Lesson From Jewish Law, 31 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 69 (2003); Shawn P. Bailey, How Secrets Are Kept: Viewing the Current
Clergy-Penitent Privilege Through a Comparison with the Attorney-Client
Privilege, 2002 BYU L. REV. 489 (2002); Rev. Martin R. Bartel, OSB,
Pennsylvania's Clergy-Communicant Privilege: For Everything There Is... A
Time to Keep Silent, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 817 (1996); Andrew A. Beerworth,
Treating Spiritual and Legal Counselors Differently: Mandatory Reporting
Laws and the Limitations of Current Free Exercise Doctrine, 10 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 73 (2004); Anthony Cardinal Bevilacqua, Confidentiality
Obligation of Clergy from the Perspective of Roman Catholic Priests, 29 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1733 (1996); Lori Lee Brocker, Sacred Secrets: The Clergy-
Penitent Privilege Finds its Way into the News, 57 OR. ST. B. BULL. 15 (1996);
Margaret Ann Burton, Nally v. Grace Community Church: Is there a Future
for Clergy Malpractice Claims?, 37 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 467 (1997); David
B. Canning, Privileged Communications in Ohio and What's New on the
Horizon: Ohio House Bill 52 Accountant-Client Privilege, 31 AKRON L. REV.
505 (1998); Cassidy, supra note 6; Robert S. Catz & Jill J. Lange, Judicial
Privilege, 22 GA. L. REV. 89 (1987); Jonathan R. Cohen, Legislating Apology:
The Pros and Cons, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 819 (2002); Colombo, supra note 13;
Charles David Creech, The Clergy-Communicant Privilege: Blessed Are the
Meek, For They Shall Remain Silent, 65 N.C. L. REV. 1390 (1987); Captain
Michael J. Davidson, Litigation Division, OTJAG, The Clergy Privilege, 1992
ARMY LAW. 16 (1992); Catharina J. H. Dubbelday, The Psychotherapist-Client
Testimonial Privilege: Defining the Professional Involved, 34 EMORY L.J. 777
(1985); Stacey A. Garber, Cox v. Miller: The Clergy Privilege and Alcoholics
Anonymous, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 917 (2003); Samuel C. Gardner, Lightam v.
Flaum, 45 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 625 (2002); Jessica R. Givelber, Imposing
Duties on Witnesses to Child Sexual Abuse: A Futile Response to Bystander
Indifference, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3169 (1999); Chad Homer, Beyond the
Confines of the Confessional: The Priest-Penitent Privilege in a Diverse
Society, 45 DRAKE L. REV. 697 (1997); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The New
Wigmore: An Essay on Rethinking the Foundation of Evidentiary Privileges,
83 B.U. L. REV. 315 (2003); J. Michael Keel, Law and Religion Collide Again:
The Priest-Penitent Privilege in Child Abuse Reporting Cases, 28 CUMB. L.
REV. 681 (1997); Lynda Womack Kenney, Role of Jaffee v. Redmond's
"Course of Diagnosis or Treatment" Condition in Preventing Abuse of the
Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 35 GA. L. REV. 345 (2000); Terrence T.
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Kossegi & Barbara Stegun Phair, The Clergy-Communicant Privilege in the
Age of Electronic Surverillance, 12 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 241
(1996); Sanford Levinson, Testimonial Privileges and the Preferences of
Friendship, 1984 DUKE L.J. 631 (1984); Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 6; Ellen
Marrus, Please Keep My Secret: Child Abuse Reporting Statutes,
Confidentiality, and Juvenile Delinquency, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 509
(1998); Michael J. Mazza, Should Clergy Hold the Priest-Penitent Privilege?,
82 MARQ. L. REV. 171 (1998); Anthony Merlino, Tightening the Seal:
Protecting the Catholic Confessional from Unprotective Priest-Penitent
Privileges, 32 SETON HALL L. REV. 655 (2002); Raymond F. Miller, Creating
Evidentiary Privileges: An Argument for the Judicial Approach, 31 CONN. L.
REV. 771 (1999); Mary Harter Mitchell, Must Clergy Tell? Child Abuse
Reporting Requirements Versus the Clergy Privilege and Free Exercise of
Religion, 71 MINN. L. REV. 723 (1987); Jeffrey Hunter Moon, Protection
Against the Discovery or Disclosure of Church Documents and Records, 39
CATH. LAW. 27 (1999); Seymour Moskowitz & Michael J. DeBoer, When
Silence Resounds: Clergy and the Requirement to Report Elder Abuse and
Neglect, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (1999); Lieutenant Jonathan G. Odom, JAGC,
USN, Beyond Arm Bands and Arms Banned: Chaplains, Armed Conflict, and
the Law, 49 NAVAL L. REV. 1 (2002); Shannon O'Malley, At All Costs:
Mandatory Child Abuse Reporting Statutes and the Clergy-Communicant
Privilege, 21 REV. LITIG. 701 (2002); Kristina K. Pappa, The Marital
Communications Privilege Does Not Preclude a Third Party From Testifying
as to the Contents of a Written Interspousal Communication and the Priest Is
the Sole Holder of the Priest-Penitent Privilege and Can Waive That Privilege
Without the Consent of the Penitent, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 1591 (1995);
Thomas J. Reed, The Futile Fifth Step: Compulsory Disclosure of Confidential
Communications Among Alcoholics Anonymous Members, 70 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 693 (1996); J. Brad Reich, A Callfor Intellectual Honesty: A Response to
the Uniform Mediation Act's Privilege Against Disclosure, 2001 J. DISP.
RESOL. 197 (2001); Karen L. Ross, Revealing Confidential Secrets: Will It
Save Our Children?, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 963 (1998); Arthur Gross
Schaefer & Dan Van Bogaert, The Changing Legal Landscape for Clergy, 42
CATH. LAW. 117 (2002); Arthur Gross Schaefer & Darren Levine, No
Sanctuary from the Law: Legal Issues Facing Clergy, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
177 (1996); Julie Ann Sippel, Priest-Penitent Privilege Statutes: Dual
Protection in the Confessional, 43 CATH. U.L. REV. 1127 (1994); Steven R.
Smith, Medical and Psychotherapy Privileges and Confidentiality: On Giving
With One Hand and Removing With the Other, 75 KY. L.J. 473 (1986); Sandra
Guerra Thompson, The White-Collar Police Force: "Duty to Report" Statutes
in Criminal Law Theory, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 3 (2002); Walter J.
Walsh, The First Free Exercise Case, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (2004);
Lennard K. Whittaker, The Priest-Penitent Privilege: Its Constitutionality and
Doctrine, 13 REGENT U. L. REV. 145 (2000); Anna Y. Yoo, Broadening the
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half of those articles appeared in the past five years.48 This is the
sort of "unabated" scholarly debate to which the Trammel Court
referred and, as such, should illustrate the privilege's current
volatility.49
Trammel's rubric applies to the clergy-penitent privilege in
much the same manner as it applied to the adverse spousal
testimonial privilege. This paper does not suggest that Trammel
should be the sole basis on which to abandon the clergy-penitent
Scope of Counselor-Patient Privilege to Protect the Privacy of the Sexual
Assault Survivor, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 255 (1995); George J. Barry, Note,
Confidentiality in the Church of the Twelve Steps, 10 J.L. & POL'Y 433 (2002);
Lieutenant Shane D. Cooper, JACG, USN, Note, Chaplains Caught in the
Middle: The Military's "Absolute" Penitent-Clergy Privilege Meets State
"Mandatory" Child Abuse Reporting Laws, 49 NAVAL L. REV. 128 (2002);
John J. Montone, III, Comment, In Search of Forgiveness: State v. Szemple
and the Priest-Penitent Privilege in New Jersey, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 263
(1995); Jessica Pae, Note, The Emasculation of Compelled Testimony: Battling
the Effects of Judicially Imposed Limitations on Grand Jury Investigations of
Terrorism and Other Ideological Crimes, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 473 (1997);
Pudelski, supra note 6; Bree Schonbrun, Comment, "In the light of reason and
experience ": The Scope of Evidentiary Privilege in the Self-Help Setting:
Alcoholics Anonymous Examined, 25 CARDoZO L. REV. 1203 (2004); Charles
Robert Steringer, Comment, The Clergy-Penitent Privilege in Oregon, 76 OR.
L. REV. 173 (1997); Jessica G. Weiner, Comment, "And the Wisdom to Know
the Difference ": Confidentiality vs. Privilege in the Self-Help Setting, 144 U.
PA. L. REV. 243 (1995); Davida A. Williams, Note, Punishing the Faithful:
Freud, Religion, and the Law, 24 CARDOzO L. REV. 2181 (2003); Jordan B.
Woods, Comment, Morales v. Portuondo: Has the Seal of the Confessional
Sprung a Leak?, 42 CATH. LAW. 105 (2002). This list of articles was compiled
through a search of LexisNexis and Westlaw legal databases. Care was taken
to only list those articles that discussed and analyzed the privilege while
filtering out those articles in which the privilege was merely mentioned or
listed.
48. See Anderson, supra note 48; Beerworth, supra note 48; Lupu & Tuttle,
supra note 6; Walsh, supra note 48; Pudelski, supra note 6; Schonbrun, supra
note 48; Abrams, supra note 6, at 1203; Bader, supra note 48; Williams, supra
note 48; Imwinkelried, supra note 48; Cassidy, supra note 6; Garber, supra
note 48; Bailey, supra note 48; Barry, supra note 48; Woods, supra note 48;
Odom, supra note 48; Cooper, supra note 48; Cohen, supra note 48; O'Malley,
supra note 48; Schaefer & Bogaert, supra note 48; Thompson, supra note 48;
Merlino, supra note 48; Gardner, supra note 48; Reich, supra note 48; Araujo,
supra note 48; Whittaker, supra note 48; Kenney, supra note 48.
49. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50.
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privilege, however. Trammel is significant because it symbolizes a
doctrinal "open door"; because the clergy-penitent privilege does
share significant characteristics with the adverse spousal testimonial
privilege, the Court should be willing to scrutinize and possibly
abandon it.
III. THE UTILITARIAN RATIONALE
DOES NOT JUSTIFY RETAINING THE CLERGY-PENITENT PRIVILEGE
A. Introduction
On what grounds will such scrutiny occur? The most generally
accepted rationale for the adoption of privileges, and the one
recognized by the Supreme Court, is the utilitarian justification.5 °
First proposed by John H. Wigmore,51 the utilitarian rationale
suggests that "communications... should be privileged only if the
benefit derived from protecting the relation outweighs the
detrimental effect of the privilege on the search for truth.
52
Wigmore delineated four conditions to assist in performing the
balancing: (1) "[t]he communication must initiate in a confidence
that they [sic] will not be disclosed"; 53 (2) "[t]his element of
confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory
maintenance of the relation between the parties"; 54 (3) "[t]he relation
must be one in which the opinion of the community ought to be
sedulously fostered"; and (4) "[t]he injury that would inure to the
relation by the disclosure of the communications must be greater
than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of
litigation."
55
Wigmore made clear that all four conditions must be present in
order for a privilege to be recognized.56 He went on to state, "[t]hat
[the factors] are present in most of the recognized privileges is plain
50. Cassidy, supra note 6, at 1632.
51. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 21, at 527 (1961).
52. Note, Development in the Law-Privileged Communication: II. Modes
of Analysis: The Theories and Justifications of Privileged Communications, 98
HARV. L. REV. 1471, 1471 (1995).
53. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 21, at 527 (1961).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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enough; and the absence of one or more of them serves why certain
privileges have failed to obtain the recognition sometimes demanded
for them."57  Although courts typically implement Wigmore's
rationale when considering whether to create new privileges, this
paper will utilize it as a framework for critiquing the existing clergy-
penitent privilege; a lack of a utilitarian justification for the privilege
cuts against retaining it. As the discussion below illustrates, the
clergy-penitent privilege appears to fail three-arguably four-of the
utilitarian requirements.
B. The Communication Does Not Initiate
in a Confidence That It Will Not Be Disclosed
In order for a privilege to remain valid, the communication that
it protects must have initiated in a confidence that it would not be
disclosed.58  Whereas Roman Catholics are bound by confiden-
tiality,59 most other religious denominations do not have an official
rule regarding privileged communications
6 ° or even confidentiality, 6 1
for that matter. The majority of individuals who enter into
communications with clergy, therefore, do so without a guarantee of
secrecy, privilege aside.
Research further suggests that the level of confidentiality one
expects has relatively little bearing on one's behavior. Several
academics conducted studies to test the layperson's expectation of
confidentiality when communicating with an attorney or
psychotherapist. These studies revealed that most individuals will
57. Id.
58. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 52, at 527 (1985).
59. Roman Catholic canon law makes it a crime "for a confessor in any
way to betray a penitent by word or in any other manner or for any reason."
BUSH & TIEMANN, supra note 41 (quoting canon 1388, section 1). People v.
Phillips involved confessions made to a Roman Catholic priest. Thus, at the
time of the privilege's inception, it did apply to the types of confidential
communications to which Wigmore referred. Because the clergy-penitent
privilege is no longer limited to auricular confessions, however, it has
outgrown the first utilitarian condition.
60. E.g., Keel, supra note 48, at 702; see Cassidy, supra note 6, at 1641
(noting that most Protestant denominations and the Jewish tradition lack
religious tenets that mandate professional secrecy).
61. E.g., Mitchell, supra, note 48.
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disclose confidential information, regardless of whether they expect
that information to be privileged.62
Although the underlying studies did not deal specifically with
the clergy-penitent privilege, several other authors have used this
research in arguing against the privilege.63  More importantly,
however, the studies cast doubt on the fundamental presumptions
underpinning the entire doctrine of privileges, including the clergy-
penitent privilege. As evidence giant Edward J. Imwinkelried stated,
"none of the studies lends any solid support to Wigmore's
generalization that without the assurance of confidentiality furnished
by an evidentiary privilege, the average or typical layperson would
not consult or confide," and added, "The world does not appear to
revolve around the courtroom to the extent that Wigmore
assumed.,
64
This demonstrated sub-Wigmorean expectation of confiden-
tiality suggests that the clergy-penitent privilege fails the first
utilitarian condition.
C. The Element of Confidentiality
Is Not Essential to the Full and Satisfactory
Maintenance of the Relation Between the Parties
The privilege fails the second condition on similar grounds.
Without a general expectation of confidentiality, it is unsound to
claim that such confidentiality is in fact "essential" to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relationship between clergy-member
and penitent.
In speaking out against the psychotherapist-patient privilege,
Justice Scalia once asked, "how come psychotherapy got to be a
thriving practice before the 'psychotherapist privilege' was
invented?, 65 In speaking out against the clergy-penitent privilege,
could not one equally ask, "how come religion got to be a thriving
practice before the clergy-penitent privilege was invented?"
The United States' religious demographics also suggest a lack of
62. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Questioning the Behavioral Assumption
Underlying Wigmorean Absolutism in the Law of Evidentiary Privileges, 65 U.
PITT. L. REv. 145, 156 (2004).
63. See, e.g., Homer, supra note 48, at 730.
64. lmwinkelried, supra note 62, at 162.
65. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 24 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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necessity for the privilege: Given that there are more than twice as
many Protestants, who generally lack a religious confidentiality
policy,66 as there are Catholics in the United States,67 it would be
somewhat overstating one's case to claim that religious relationships
could not adequately survive without an element of confidentiality.
The numbers indicate that such relationships do survive.
Whereas there are religions whose tenets are silent with regards
to confidentiality, there are other religions that actually mandate
disclosure. Such a predicament arose in Lightman v. Flaum.68 In
Lightman, an Orthodox-Jewish woman sought marriage counseling
from a rabbi. During the course of the meeting, she revealed to the
rabbi that she had stopped "religious bathing" in violation of Jewish
law. 69 "[P]ursuant to Jewish law, [the rabbi] was obliged to relay
this information to plaintiffs husband in order to prevent him from
engaging in conjugal relations with his wife in violation of the
Torah., 70 This case provides an ideal example of how the clergy-
penitent privilege is at times overly inclusive: it presumes that the
underlying religion it is protecting actually professes confidentiality.
In order to maintain a sound relationship with the husband, the rabbi
in Lightman was religiously bound to disclose the wife's
transgressions.
Although Catholicism does profess strict confidentiality, most
religions do not, and some religions, as just illustrated, actually
profess disclosure. As such, the element of confidentiality is not
essential to satisfactorily maintain the relationship between a clergy-
member and a penitent.
D. The Relation Is Not One in Which the Opinion
of the Community Ought to Be Sedulously Fostered
"Sedulous" means "persevering and constant in effort or
application.",7' Thus, the third condition suggests that the clergy-
66. See Cassidy, supra, note 6, at 1641.
67. See World Religion Day 2005, Statistics, http://www.worldreligionday.
org/statistics.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2006).
68. 97 N.Y.2d 128 (2001).
69. Id. at 131.
70. Id. at 132.
71. Dictionary.com, Sedulous, http://dictionary.reference.com/
search?q=sedulously (last visited Apr. 20, 2005).
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penitent privilege should be retained only if the community
perseveringly and uninterruptedly believes that the clergy-penitent
relationship "deserves special solicitude. 72
Far from sedulous, public support for clergy-members has ebbed
and flowed over time.73 For example, confidence in clergy reached
its peak in 1985, 74 when "67% of Americans rated the clergy 'very
high' or 'high' in honesty and ethical standards. 75  This figure
dropped to 60% in 1988,76 and to 55% in 1990.
77
In 2002, 66% of the public stated that Protestant ministers "can
be trusted," whereas only 45% said the same of Catholic priests.78
This ranking symbolized a drop of fourteen percentage points in one
year.79 Both groups of clergy were ranked lower than teachers,8 °
small business owners, 81 youth sport coaches, 82 and ordinary men orwomen:83 groups whose communications are not governed by an
evidentiary privilege. As one advocate noted, "These figures are all
the more remarkable, considering the efforts of President Bush and
assorted politicians and clergy to rally the nation under the banner of
religious faith. . . following September 11 '84
Gallup conducted a more recent poll in 2005, asking individuals
to rate honesty and ethical standards of individuals in different fields.
72. Mitchell, supra note 48, at 765.
73. See, e.g., John Dart, Clergy Seek Answers to Plunge in Public Image,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1992, at B4 ("polls have shown cyclical variations").
74. Clergy Ratings at Lowest Point Ever: Survey Finds Low Trust in the
Church, RELIGION NEWS SERVICES, Jan. 12, 2003, available at
http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2003/002/12.21/html.
75. Dart, supra note 73.
76. Id. Pharmacists bumped the clergy out of the top rank in 1988. Id.
77. Id.
78. Ontario Consultants on Religious Tolerance, Americans' Level of
Confidence In People and Institutions, at http://www.religioustolerance.org/
chrconf.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2006).
79. Confidence in Catholic priests ranked at 59% in 2001. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Humphrey Taylor, Trust in Priests and Clergy falls 26 points in Twelve
Months: Teachers, Doctors and Professors are Trusted to Tell the Truth by
Most People, THE HARRIS POLL #63, Nov. 27, 2002, available at
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris-poll/index.asp?PID= 3 4 2 .
84. Id.
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Only 54% of those polled stated "high" or "very high" in terms of
clergy's honesty and ethical standards. 85 In fact, clergy ranked ten
percentage points lower than teachers in this poll.
86
The past decade has also proved remarkable in light of
Catholics' tendencies toward (or rather, against) religious activities.
An Irish poll revealed that 36% of Catholics stated that clergy sex
abuse cases had negatively affected their religious practices. 87 Of
that 36%, more than one half stated a decline in attending mass.
88
Furthermore, when asked whether they would trust new priests in
their neighborhood, more Catholics than not stated they "would
wonder" about the new priest's trustworthiness.89
This move away from religious practice has also reached our
side of the pond. Religious advocates have noted that "the family
drive to church for Saturday confession is now a thing of the past":
90
53% of Catholics never or almost never practice confession. 91 And
"[t]his trend isn't likely to reverse itself anytime soon."92 The reason
for this move away from confession is that Catholics "feel
uncomfortable confessing their sins to a priest." 93 Confession has
simply become an "endangered sacrament.
'" 94
Consequently, public support for the privilege has also ebbed
and flowed. England failed to recognize such a privilege 95 as did the
United States until 18 13.96 There then came a point where every
state in the nation statutorily recognized some form of the clergy-
85. The Gallup Organization, GALLUP POLL, Nov. 17-20, 2005, available
at http://www.pollingreport.com/values.htm.
86. Id.
87. Nuala Haughey, Religious Practice Hit by Paedophile Cases, IRISH
TIMES, Nov. 6, 2002, at 7.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Renee M. LaReau, Confession: A Shadow of Its Former Self, U.S.
CATHOLIC, Nov., 2005, at 12.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. E.g., Mitchell, supra note 48, at 765.
96. See supra Part II.D. for a discussion of the privilege's inception in
American jurisprudence.
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penitent privilege. 97 Today, nearly half of the states have abrogated
the privilege with their mandatory reporting statutes. 98 Many of
those states have left other privileges, such as the attorney-client
privilege, unaffected.99 Such differential treatment may reflect an
underlying lack of sympathy toward the clergy-penitent privilege
when compared to other testimonial privileges.
Given the lengthy history of societal ambivalence toward both
the privilege and the clergy, the relationship between clergy and
penitent can hardly be labeled as one in which the community's
opinion has been sedulously fostered. It is volatile, subject to the
public's ever-changing whims and perceptions. The community's
opinion has fallen short of the utilitarian mandate that it be
''persevering or constant in effort or application," and thus fails the
third utilitarian condition.
E. The Injury That Would Inure to the Relation by
the Disclosure of the Communications May Not Be Greater Than
the Benefit Thereby Gained for the Correct Disposal of Litigation
The fourth condition required by the utilitarian rationale poses
some academic difficulty because it is nearly impossible to gather
empirical evidence to support or refute it;' 00 it consists of weighing
soft variables. This section will thus consist only of a general
97. E.g., Cassidy, supra note 6, at 1639.
98. "Mandatory reporting statutes" refers to statutes that mandate reporting
in cases of child (and occasionally elder) abuse. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-
3620 (2004); CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165.7 (West 2004); COLO. REV. STAT. §
19-3-304 (2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17A-101 (2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
16, § 903 (2004); 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4 (Supp. 2004); IND. CODE § 31-33-
5-1 (2004); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.030 (LexisNexis 2004); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 119, § 51A (2004); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.623 (West Supp.
2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-353 (2004); MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.115
(West 2004); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-711 (2004); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
202.882 (LexisNexis 2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.10 (West 2004); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-03 (2004); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7103 (2004); 23 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 6311 (2004); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-510 (2004); TENN. CODE
ANN. 37-1-403 (2004); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.101 (Vernon 2004); WIS.
STAT. § 48.981 (2004); WYO. STAT. ANN. 14-3-205 (2004).
99. Beerworth, supra note 48, at 100 (referring to the laws of North
Carolina, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and West Virginia).
100. Bailey, supra note 48, at 505.
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discussion of the countervailing interests at stake.
As discussed previously, most religions lack a confidentiality
policy.' 10 Although a strong public policy exists in favor of fostering
spiritual counseling, 10 2 there is some evidence to suggest that
individuals will continue to consult religious advisors even without
the privilege. 103 Recent polls and anecdotes also suggest that fewer
people are actually practicing confessional.
10 4
At the same time, there is a strong need "for every man's
evidence."' 5 A complete evidentiary picture is essential both in
individual cases and in upholding our adversarial legal system.'
0 6
Although it is impossible to reach a conclusion when assessing
immeasurable variables, it is possible that the clergy-penitent
privilege fails the utilitarian rationale's fourth condition.
IV. THE CLERGY-PENITENT PRIVILEGE
VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The First Amendment provides, "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof...,,07 These two clauses, known as the
Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause, respectively, create
an inherent tension whereby the government must allow individuals
to freely exercise their religious beliefs while simultaneously
avoiding a state-sanctioned preference for religion.
The clergy-penitent privilege exemplifies the tension between
the two clauses. Does the Free Exercise Clause require the
government to protect confidential religious communications? Does
the Establishment clause prevent the state from doing so? These
questions will be explored below.
A. The Free Exercise Clause Does Not Require the Privilege
The New York Court of General Session relied upon the Free
Exercise Clause as its basis for recognizing the clergy-penitent
101. See supra notes 59, 60.
102. See, e.g., Bailey, supra note 48, at 506.
103. See supra Part III.B.
104. See supra Part III.D.
105. People v. Nixon, 18 U.S. 683, 709 (1974).
106. See id.
107. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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privilege:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." In this
country... there is religious freedom guaranteed by the
constitution, and consecrated by the social compact.
It is essential to the free exercise of a religion, that its
ordinances should be administered-that its ceremonies as
well as its essentials should be protected .... To decide that
the minister shall promulgate what he receives in
confession, is to declare that there shall be no penance; and
this important branch of the Roman catholic religion would
be thus annihilated.1
0 8
The Court's reliance on the Free Exercise Clause in 1813 has
proven to be unfounded, however. The Supreme Court has never
ruled on the First Amendment's applicability to the clergy-penitent
privilege, 10 9 but the Court has stated that the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination is the only constitutionally-based
privilege.' 10
Moreover, current Free Exercise doctrine would comfortably
support the privilege's abolition. In Employment Division v.
Smith, "' the Court held that generally applicable and neutral laws do
not offend the First Amendment, even if they have the incidental
effect of burdening religion.' The underlying case concerned the
sacramental use of peyote, a hallucinogenic drug. Smith tested
positive for use of the drug and the government denied him
unemployment benefits on that ground. Smith claimed that in
enforcing this administrative law, the government had violated his
Free Exercise rights because he was using the drugs as part of his
religious rituals. The Court found the unemployment statute to pass
108. SAMPSON, supra note 42, at I11.
109. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 689-90 (declaring that "the only
testimonial privilege for unofficial witnesses that is rooted in the Federal
Constitution is the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-
incrimination").
110. Id.; see also In re Williams, 152 S.E.2d 317, 325-25 (N.C. 1967)
(stating that the Free Exercise Clause does not provide a clergy member with
independent grounds for refusing to testify).
111. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
112. See id. at 878.
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constitutional muster and based its holding on the rationale that
"[c]onscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle
for religious toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a
general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious
beliefs," 113 and went on to state that, "[t]he mere possession of
religious convictions which contradict the relevant concerns of a
political society does not relieve the citizen from the discharge of
political responsibilities."'" 4  One author, reiterating the Court's
holding, noted that "Smith ... is... merely a formal recognition of
the Court's time-honored abhorrence of constitutionally protected
'lawlessness'-of the religious citizen becoming, in a sense, her own
lawgiver due to some religious tenet or sacramental rite."
' 15
The abolition of the clergy-penitent privilege would fall squarely
within Smith's rule. The duty to testify is generally-applicable and
religiously-neutral obligation. It may, in cases of Roman Catholics,
however, stand squarely in contradiction of religious practices,
namely the sacraments of confessional and secrecy. As illustrated
below, such contradiction with Catholic tenets is not constitutionally
significant because it is merely an incidental effect of a neutral law.
The Court in Smith reaffirmed many of its former statements in
Reynolds v. United States, a case that raised similar issues as those
emanating from the clergy-penitent privilege. Reynolds involved a
man who was charged with violating a Utah law prohibiting bigamy.
He claimed exemption from the law on the grounds that his religious
tenets-Mormonism-required him to have multiple wives lest he
suffer "damnation in the life to come."116 Despite such severe
religious consequences, the Court found no Free Exercise violation
because to permit such religious exemption "would be to make the
113. Id. at 885 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 145 (1879)).
114. Id. at 885-86 (quoting Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 145). Reynolds involved a
man who was charged with violating a Utah law prohibiting bigamy. He
claimed exemption from the law on the grounds that his religious tenets-
Mormonism-required him to have multiple wives lest he suffer "damnation in
the life to come." Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 161. Even with such severe religious
consequences, the Court was not persuaded because to permit such religious
exemption "would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief
superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become
a law unto himself." Id. at 167.
115. Beerworth, supra note 48, at 75.
116. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 161.
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professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land,
and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto
himself."' 17
Most religious leaders would not face a predicament similar to
that in Reynolds because most religions lack a confidentiality policy
and, as such, do not reprimand clergy for revealing the content of
communications made with penitents. Roman Catholicism, however,
does proscribe revelation of confidential communications. Under
Catholic canon law, "the confession is inviolable, no matter what
civil law says or does not say."'18 A direct violation of this rule "is
punished by the latae sententiae excommunication of the priest, with
remission reserved solely to the very highest authority in the
church."1 9 In Reynolds, the petitioner faced the threat of damnation
in his next life; in the Roman Catholic church, priests would face a
milder threat of excommunication. In both cases, however, the party
is elevating his religious tenets above those prescribed by U.S. law.
Although the Constitution permits laws to accommodate religious
beliefs and practices, it does not require it.12 As such, abolition of
the clergy-penitent privilege would pass constitutional muster in the
same manner as proscribing polygamy did in Reynolds.
B. The Privilege Violates the Establishment Clause
Although the Constitution permits religious accommodations,
those accommodations are still subject to the Establishment Clause's
confines. Establishment Clause jurisprudence largely consists of two
competing theories: the separationist theory and the
nonpreferentialist theory. The separationist theory views the
Establishment Clause as, in the words of Thomas Jefferson, a "wall
of separation" between church and state, such that it precludes the
government from advancing or inhibiting religion in general. 12 1 In
contrast, the nonpreferentialist theory centers on the idea that the
government may provide aid to religion so long as it does not prefer
certain religious groups over others in doing so.122
117. Id. at 167.
118. BUSH & TIEMANN, supra note 41.
119. Id.
120. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
121. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
122. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 106 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
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Whether one applies the separationist theory or the
nonpreferentialist theory to test the clergy-penitent privilege's
validity, the result remains the same: the privilege violates the
Establishment Clause.
1. The Separationist Theory
The Supreme Court articulated the primary test for
Establishment Clause claims based on a separationist theory in
Lemon v. Kurtzman. 12 3  The test consists of three prongs: (1)
whether the statute's legislative purpose is secular; (2) whether the
statute has the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion; and
(3) whether the statute fosters excessive entanglement with
religion. 24 If the statute fails any of the three prongs, the Court will
find it violates the Constitution. The clergy-penitent privilege clearly
violates two-arguably three-of the Lemon test's prongs and, as
such, runs afoul of the First Amendment.
a. The statute's legislative purpose is religious
"The First Amendment requires that a statute must be
invalidated if it is entirely motivated by a purpose to advance
religion."'' 25  Interestingly, even proponents of the clergy-penitent
privilege concede that it may have a religious purpose. 26 Where a
statute's intent is religious, such intent involves the state in religious
activities and, in turn, demonstrates a lack of secular purpose.
27
The New York Court of General Session's purpose in initially
recognizing the clergy-penitent privilege was to promote the
sacrament of confession.128 Although the privilege now transcends
the Roman Catholic religion, its purpose still remains to promote
individuals' religious freedoms. As one author succinctly framed the
matter, "Since a clergyman-communicant privilege is available only
dissenting) (stating that the Establishment Clause forbids "preference among
religious sects or denominations").
123. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
124. Id. at 612.
125. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56.
126. See, e.g., Whittaker, supra note 48, at 154 (stating that "a secular
purpose for the privilege may be open to question").
127. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 78.
128. See SAMPSON, supra note 42.
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to religious persons and is not extended to the general public, the
state makes clear its intent only to benefit religious groups."'
129
One could conceivably argue that the privilege's purpose is to
promote societal health and well-being, which flow from the ability
to find solace in a religious leader. Such a purpose would appear to
be secular. The Supreme Court has made clear, however, that
Lemon's first prong "is not a pushover for any secular claim."' 30 In
other words, although "the Court often does accept governmental
statements of purpose ... in those unusual cases ... [where] the
secular purpose [was] secondary, the unsurprising results have been
findings of no adequate secular object, as against a predominantly
religious one." 
1 3 1
For example, in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe,
132
the Supreme Court struck down a school's policy of student led
prayer prior to football games, despite the school's stated secular
purposes. One of such purposes was to "solemnize sporting
events."'133 The Court found this purpose to be nothing more than a
guise: "[T]he use of an invocation to foster such solemnity is
impermissible when, in actuality, it constitutes prayer sponsored by
the school."'134  This statement seems to suggest that an alleged
secular purpose is nonetheless religious if it merely promotes a
religious act through a secular vehicle.
Applying this reasoning to clergy-penitent privilege statutes
implies that even if the stated purpose of the statute is, arguendo, to
promote general societal health and well-being, using
communications between the penitents and clergy to foster such
societal health and well-being is problematic because it constitutes
an intent to promote religion. The following syllogism illustrates
this point: The state's intent is to increase societal health and well-
being. Communicating to a clergy-member increases societal health
129. Jane E. Mayes, Comment, Striking Down the Clergyman-Communicant
Privilege Statutes: Let Free Exercise of Religion Govern, 62 IND. L.J. 397, 404
(1986) (citing Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Sherbert v. Vemer,
374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
130. McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 U.S. 2722, 2736 (2005).
131. Id.
132. 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
133. Id. at 309.
134. Id.
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and well-being. The state, therefore, has an intent to increase
communications to clergy-members.
b. The statute has the primary effect
of advancing or inhibiting religion
Although most statutes that have a religious purpose also have a
religious effect, 35 even statutes with secular purposes may be found
to violate the Establishment Clause if their primary effect is to
advance or inhibit religion. 136 The Supreme Court struck down such
a statute in Sloan v. Lemon.' 37 The statute in Sloan provided state
reimbursement to parents whose children attended nonpublic schools
(most of which were religious), without mandating how parents
could spend such reimbursements. Although the court found the
statute to have a secular purpose,' 38 the court nonetheless found the
statute unconstitutional because of the program's religious
"substance."'139 The court reasoned that the state had "singled out a
class of its citizens for a special economic benefit," and "Whether
that benefit be viewed as a simple tuition subsidy, as an incentive to
parents to send their children to sectarian schools, or as a reward for
having done so, at bottom its intended consequence is to preserve
and support religion-oriented institutions."'
' 40
Thus, even if one reaches the conclusion that the clergy-penitent
privilege's intent is secular, the privilege is nonetheless
unconstitutional because of its substance. Like the Sloan statute,
clergy-penitent privilege statutes single out an individual class of
citizens for a special benefit, albeit an intangible evidentiary benefit
rather than an economic one. Such statutes also fundamentally
preserve and support religion-oriented institutions, namely religions
themselves.
On a more theoretical level, the clergy-penitent privilege places
religion above judicial fact-finding processes. Although all
privileges contravene the need for evidence in criminal proceedings,
only the clergy-penitent privilege advances religion at the cost of
135. See, e.g., Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
136. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
137. 413 U.S. 825 (1973).
138. Id. at 829-30.
139. Id. at 832 (emphasis added).
140. Id. (emphasis added).
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other societal goals. This type of advancement, in conjunction with a
lack of a secular purpose, renders the clergy-penitent privilege
constitutionally suspect.
c. The statute fosters excessive entanglement with religion
14 1
In order to determine whether the government entanglement
with religion is excessive, it is necessary to "examine the character
and purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the nature of the
aid that the State provides, and the resulting relationship between the
government and the religious authority." 142 Although the bulk of
jurisprudence dealing with excessive entanglement has focused
around government aid to parochial schools, 143 the clergy-penitent
privilege appears to violate the excessive entanglement prong.
First, the Supreme Court has held that if an institution is
pervasively religious, any government benefit conferred therein is
suspect. 144 In terms of the clergy-penitent privilege, religious groups
themselves are those that receive a benefit. By definition, such
groups are pervasively religious.
Second, in allowing for a clergy-penitent privilege, the
government is providing a type of aid that is largely
immeasurable. 145 One could argue that the government is primarily
providing a psychic aid to religious groups. By deeming certain
communications within those groups to be privileged, the
government is facilitating religious worship and essentially
alleviating some of the pressures that accompany confessions and
141. Several years ago, the Court suggested that it made for judicial
efficiency to fold the entanglement inquiry into the primary effect inquiry
because both rely on the same evidence. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S.
639, 669 (2002). With that in mind, the third prong of the Lemon test
essentially loops back into the second. As discussed above, because the
clergy-penitent privilege appears to violate Lemon's second prong, it will
consequently violate the third prong as well, should the Court choose to follow
this new reasoning.
142. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971).
143. See, e.g., id.; Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
144. Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349, 362-66 (1975) (concluding that
parochial schools are pervasively religious).
145. Its immeasurability stems from the fact that most of the cases dealing
with excessive entanglement concern monetary aid from the government,
which is clearly measurable in dollars and cents.
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spiritual counseling. Framed in this manner, the privilege aids
religious groups by, as one author stated, "strengthening [the
religion's] moral fiber."
' 146
Lastly, the Court disapproved of government aid requiring
"comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance"
to uphold the First Amendment.' 147  In Lemon, the Constitution
would have required courts to monitor parochial teachers' secular
classes to ensure that they were not polluted by religious values.
This amounted to excessive entanglement. In the context of the
clergy-penitent privilege, courts may need to inquire into religious
entities' practices and beliefs when determining whether the
privilege applies. 48 Concededly, this does not rise to the level of
entanglement portrayed in Lemon.
It is certainly possible that the Court would not find excessive
entanglement were it to scrutinize a clergy-penitent privilege statute
under the Lemon test. If the Court were to strike down such a statute,
it would inevitably use one of Lemon's other prongs to do so.
2. The Nonpreferentialist Theory
The Court in Larson v. Valente declared, "The clearest
command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious
denomination cannot be officially preferred over another."'' 49 State
laws granting denominational preferences are thus subject to strict
scrutiny. 15  They must therefore be narrowly tailored and must
further a compelling government interest, lest they violate the First
Amendment.' 51
A state's interest in promulgating a clergy-penitent privilege
statute would likely be to promote societal health and well-being by
protecting confidential communications. The problem arises,
146. Mayes, supra note 128, at 408.
147. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619.
148. For example, if the Supreme Court were placed in a position whereby it
had to decide a case such as Lightman v. Flaum, 761 N.E. 2d 1027 (N.Y.
2001), where a religion's confidentiality policy diametrically opposes that
mandated by the privilege, one could imagine some entanglement arising. Id.
at 1032. See supra Part III.C.
149. 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1981).
150. Id. at 246.
151. Id. at 247.
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however, when statutes confer the privilege's benefits onto certain
religious groups but not others. For example, Vermont's statute only
protects a "priest or minister of the gospel"; 52 Wyoming offers
protection for "a clergyman or priest;"' 53 Georgia's statute limits the
definition of clergy to "any Protestant minister of the Gospel, or to
any priest of the Roman Catholic faith, or to any priest of the Greek
Orthodox Catholic faith, or to any Jewish rabbi, or to any Christian
or Jewish minister, by whatever name called."'
' 54
The problem arises when considering non-Western religions
such as Buddhism or Islam or controversial religions such as
Scientology, given that "Free exercise.., can be guaranteed only
when legislators-and voters-are required to accord to their own
religions the very same treatment given to small, new, or unpopular
denominations."' 155  By accounting for certain religions but not
others, clergy-penitent privilege statutes fail strict scrutiny because
they are not narrowly tailored; states with discriminatory statutes
lack a legitimate state interest that would allow them to include
certain religions at the exclusion of others. 56  Thus, Larson's
nonpreferentialist approach would strike down these laws as
violating the First Amendment.
V. CONCLUSION
This author recognizes that the clergy-penitent privilege is
largely caught in a Catch-22: Wigmore's utilitarian framework
requires that the privilege apply only in situations where parties
152. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. § 12, 1607 (2004).
153. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-101(a)(ii) (2004).
154. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-22 (2004).
155. Larson v. Valate, 456 U.S. 228, 245 (1981).
156. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 385 n.14 (1990)
(stating that "the prospect of restricting the privilege to Roman Catholic
penitential communications raises serious first amendment concerns"); Mayes,
supra note 128, at 410 ("If the state's interest in enacting the religious
confidentiality statute is to protect confidential communication between
clergymen and communicants and to encourage persons to seek spiritual
guidance, a statute which prefers some religions over others does not
effectively promote this interest. A discriminatory clergyman-communicant
statute affords benefits to the favored religion which are not available to other
denominations and, therefore, discourages confidential communication and
religious counseling in minority denominations.").
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expect privacy, whereas the Establishment Clause's
nonpreferentialist approach mandates that the privilege apply across
all religions equally; the bases on which the privilege was first
recognized are no longer doctrinally-sound; the doctrinally-sound
reasons for retaining the privilege today can be incongruous to the
goals of having the privilege at all. The clergy-penitent privilege has
essentially been hoisted by its own petard.
While this situation is unfortunate, it should not justify retaining
an anomalous privilege. Our legal framework is based upon stare
decisis; it is based upon consistency; it is based upon resiliency.
Continuing to uphold a privilege that undermines these fundamental
principles is tantamount to deeming them worthless.
If ever there were a time to strike the privilege down, it is now.
The current social climate surrounding the clergy-penitent privilege
indicates that the time is ripe to reconsider the privilege's validity.
The time is also ripe in a legal sense, given the similarities between
the current status of the clergy-penitent privilege and the status of the
adverse spousal testimonial privilege at the time the Court abolished
it. The clergy-penitent privilege lacks the utilitarian justifications
that existed at the time of its inception and seemingly violates the
Establishment Clause.
Given the social and legal climate, the Supreme Court will likely
consider the clergy-penitent privilege's doctrinal validity and
constitutionality in the near future. Because the privilege operates on
both the state and federal level, the Supreme Court will probably
only have opportunity to consider the privilege's validity if a party
directly challenges its constitutionality.
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